Justice in procreation : five essays on population size, parenthood and new arrivals

People create new people. This rather obvious and seemingly trivial fact raises a range of important and complex questions in moral and political philosophy. I argue that certain demographic developments are better than others from the point of view of justice: at the very least, we need to make sure the size of future generations is compatible with sustainable just institutions. Crucial when thinking about population size, population policies and moral limits to procreation, is the question of what – if anything – makes procreation particularly valuable. By an appeal to the role that future generations play in our lives and to goods of parenthood, I defend an account of the value of procreation. I explore the implications of this account for the role fertility reduction can play in making the world more sustainable. In addition, I ask who should carry to costs of parenthood and procreation, and explore in particular the grounds on which firms could be said to have an obligation to contribute. Finally, I ask what – if anything – can justify the practice of including new-borns as full members of society, while at the same time refusing citizenship to many prospective immigrant. What makes them different? I reject several candidate arguments, and argue that the grounds on which the practice can be defended are both limited and surprising. Taken together, the five chapters in this thesis aim to contribute to a more complete account of justice in procreation. It investigates what liberal egalitarian theories of justice require in the domain of procreation, and evaluates several principles that should inform our individual and collective decisions around the creation and the accommodation of new people.(FILO - Philosophie) -- UCL, 201