Add to ORKGWe consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequal production skills which can in no way be attributed to their responsibility. We study how it is possible, if at all, to compensate for dfferential skills by applying Rawls's idea of a collective sharing in the benefits of skills. For this purpose, we introduce an axiom of solidarity, according to which agents should all be affected in the same direction if the profile of personal skills changes. We show that particular allocation rules are characterized be combining this axiom with a requirement of non-discrimination among preferences, or with a property capturing Nozick's idea of guaranteeing a minimal bene®fit from one's own skill
We present a new fair allocation, coined a 'Pareto-efficient and Shared Resources Equivalent' alloca...
A parametric surplus-sharing problem is given by a set X of feasible utility vectors and a disagreem...
A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly su...
We consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequal production skills which...
In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly un-equal production skills and with th...
In a simple production model where skills may differ among agents, we consider that skills are commo...
We consider a simple production model and assume that the agents have unequal production skills that...
We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with differ-ent, non transferable, personal ta...
In a model where individuals with different levels of skills exert different levels of effort, we pr...
Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different charact...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
A general model of lower bound (individual rationality) and upper bound axioms for fair allocation i...
In this paper, we consider a version of the Holmström-Milgrom linear model with two tasks, producti...
In production economies with unequal labor skills, one of the intrinsic features for Nash implementa...
In production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant to the set of feasi...
We present a new fair allocation, coined a 'Pareto-efficient and Shared Resources Equivalent' alloca...
A parametric surplus-sharing problem is given by a set X of feasible utility vectors and a disagreem...
A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly su...
We consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequal production skills which...
In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly un-equal production skills and with th...
In a simple production model where skills may differ among agents, we consider that skills are commo...
We consider a simple production model and assume that the agents have unequal production skills that...
We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with differ-ent, non transferable, personal ta...
In a model where individuals with different levels of skills exert different levels of effort, we pr...
Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different charact...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
A general model of lower bound (individual rationality) and upper bound axioms for fair allocation i...
In this paper, we consider a version of the Holmström-Milgrom linear model with two tasks, producti...
In production economies with unequal labor skills, one of the intrinsic features for Nash implementa...
In production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant to the set of feasi...
We present a new fair allocation, coined a 'Pareto-efficient and Shared Resources Equivalent' alloca...
A parametric surplus-sharing problem is given by a set X of feasible utility vectors and a disagreem...
A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly su...