La dispersion salariale augmente-t-elle l’absentéisme au sein des firmes ?

The aim of this paper is to provide a critical summary of the literature regarding the relationship between wage dispersion and sickness absenteeism. From a theoretical point of view, according to the tournament theory, this relation could be either i) negative, due to the incentive effect induced by the expected attribution of the largest prize to the most productive worker or ii) positive, because of adverse working conditions associated to required increased productivity in order to win the prize. On the other hand, according to a group of theories based on fairness considerations, this relation could be i) positive, because of the lower cooperation induced among the workforce, or ii) negative, if a higher wage dispersion is perceived as a sign of gratitude by the more productive workers. We present the very few studies we are aware of analyzing the influence of wage dispersion on sickness absenteeism with particular attention devoted to the empirical results that have been obtained for the Belgian private sector