Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident

Kantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental, and that how an agent might have acted in other circumstances does not determine the moral worth of her actual conduct. In this paper, I argue that neither the Kantian nor her rivals can adequately accommodate both intuitions, in as much as non-accidentality presupposes counterfactual robustness. If we are to adequately accommodate both claims, then we must reconsider the kind of non-accidentality that really matters to moral worth. I propose that the kind of non-accidentality worth caring about requires only that the agent who does what is right acts competently from morally relevant concerns. Under this account, both the Kantian and (some of) her rivals can ensure that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental without counting the behaviour of non-actual agents as being relevant to assessments of moral worth