IL DIFFICILE BILANCIAMENTO TRA ISTANZE UNIFICANTI E ISTANZE AUTONOMISTICHE NEL RAPPORTO FRA STATO E REGIONI

The research aims to explore the balance between unifying demands and autonomist ones in the State-Region relationship. More specifically, the first chapter describes the limits national interest had in the previous constitutional system. The second chapter deals with the national interest and unitary requests in the constitutional system currently in force. The third chapter examines the impacts of the «Sewel convention» on the distribution of legislative powers between Westminster and Holyrood. The fourth chapter explores the evolution of the «chiamata in sussidiarietà» in the constitutional case law (that is, the rule according to which the State can legislate over matters not falling within the scope of its legislative powers, on the grounds of the principle of subsidiarity, provided said “extraordinary” State law meets the requirements of proportionality and reasonableness and that appropriate consultation with the Region(s) concerned is provided for). The last chapter dwells on the analysis of the state supremacy clause established by Article 31 of the law amending the Italian Constitution, which was rejected as a result of the constitutional referendum of 4 December 2016. In conclusion, this thesis aims to highlight the difficulties of seeking a reasonable balance between unifying requests and autonomist ones. Indeed, the risk is, on the one hand, that the former prevail over the latter, and on the other hand and above all, that the instruments which in principle are aimed to protect the unifying requests become a means at the service of the Government