The Hospitals/Residents problem is a many-to-one extension of the stable marriage problem. In an instance, each hospital specifies a quota, i.e., an upper bound on the number of positions it provides. It is well-known that in any instance, there exists at least one stable matching, and finding one can be done in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider an extension in which each hospital specifies not only an upper bound but also a lower bound on its number of positions. In this setting, there can be instances that admit no stable matching, but the problem of asking if there is a stable matching is solvable in polynomial time. In case there is no stable matching, we consider the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possibl...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals ...
We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants' preferences ...
Abstract. We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants ’ p...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of intending junior docto...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of intending junior docto...
Stable matching problems with lower quotas are fundamental in academic hiring andensuring operabilit...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals ...
Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, ...
In practical applications, algorithms for the classical version of the Hospitals Residents problem (...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples ( hrc ) is a generalisation of the classical Hospi...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
AbstractThe hospitals/residents (HR) problem is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage ...
Abstract. An instance of the stable marriage problem is an undirected bipartite graph G = (X ∪ ̇ W,E...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals ...
We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants' preferences ...
Abstract. We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants ’ p...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of intending junior docto...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of intending junior docto...
Stable matching problems with lower quotas are fundamental in academic hiring andensuring operabilit...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals ...
Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, ...
In practical applications, algorithms for the classical version of the Hospitals Residents problem (...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples ( hrc ) is a generalisation of the classical Hospi...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
AbstractThe hospitals/residents (HR) problem is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage ...
Abstract. An instance of the stable marriage problem is an undirected bipartite graph G = (X ∪ ̇ W,E...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching...
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals ...
We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants' preferences ...
Abstract. We study a version of the well-known Hospitals/Residents problem in which participants ’ p...