International audienceProcess calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successful in two research strands: (a) the analysis of security protocols and (b) the enforcement of correct message-passing programs. Despite their shared foundations, languages and reasoning techniques for (a) and (b) have been separately developed. Here we connect two representative calculi from (a) and (b): we encode a (high-level) $$\pi $$-calculus for multiparty sessions into a (low-level) applied $$\pi $$-calculus for security protocols. We establish the correctness of our encoding, and we show how it enables the integrated analysis of security properties and communication correctness by re-using existing tools
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the obs...
Abstract. When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very differ...
Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successf...
textabstractProcess calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been v...
Recently there has been much interest towards using formal methods in the analysis of security proto...
The challenges hidden in the implementation of high-level process calculi into low-level environment...
As concurrent systems become ever more complex and ever more ubiquitous, the need to understand and ...
We design a core language of principals running distributed programs over a public network. Our lang...
Abstract. We are interested in computationally sound implementations for languages of distributed co...
Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to ma...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
Language-based and process calculi-based information security are well developed fields of computer ...
Recently there has been much interest towards using formal methods in the analysis of security proto...
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the obs...
Abstract. When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very differ...
Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successf...
textabstractProcess calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been v...
Recently there has been much interest towards using formal methods in the analysis of security proto...
The challenges hidden in the implementation of high-level process calculi into low-level environment...
As concurrent systems become ever more complex and ever more ubiquitous, the need to understand and ...
We design a core language of principals running distributed programs over a public network. Our lang...
Abstract. We are interested in computationally sound implementations for languages of distributed co...
Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to ma...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
Language-based and process calculi-based information security are well developed fields of computer ...
Recently there has been much interest towards using formal methods in the analysis of security proto...
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the obs...
Abstract. When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very differ...