Preventing tax mitigation in Slovenia and Germany

Citat znamenitega Benjamina Franklina (1789) »Na tem svetu sta le dve stvari gotovi: smrt in davki.« vsekakor deluje prepričujoče, a ne pove, da se ti dve stvari med seboj bistveno razlikujeta. Smrti se namreč ne moremo izogniti, davku pa se lahko na več načinov. Prav to počnejo davčni zavezanci, tako na zakonit kot tudi na nezakonit način. Noben zakon ne more urediti vseh konkretnih primerov, ki jih lahko prinese davek. Ukrepov za omejitev davčnega izogibanja je vedno več, tako na ravni EU kot tudi v nacionalnih zakonodajah. Glede na vse javno znane davčne afere pa se davčni zavezanci v trenutnih časih, v katerih vlada prenormiranost, vedno bolj izogibajo vsem regulacijam. Razlog za tako stanje pa je morda treba iskati ravno v številnih ohlapnih in nedoločnih zakonskih ukrepih na področju davčnega izogibanja. Rešitev pa se morda nahaja v enostavnih, jasnih in določnih zakonskih ukrepih proti davčnemu izogibanju. V nemški davčni teoriji je mogoče zaslediti več stališč, ki zagovarjajo, da imajo davčni zavezanci »pravico« do prostovoljne izbire ustrezne oblikovne možnosti prava. In če je posledica takšne oblikovne možnosti prava izognitev plačilu davkov, je za to mogoče kriviti le zakonodajalca, ki mora nositi breme slabe zakonodaje. Temu seveda ni vedno tako, a miselnost nemških teoretikov je na tem področju precej drugačna od miselnosti slovenskih teoretikov. Davčno izogibanje ne more biti vedno nedovoljeno, agresivno in nezaželeno. Do neke mere je to normalen in celo zaželen pojav. Namen tega dela ni prikazati, kako nemoralno je davčno izogibanje. Gre bolj za primerjavo podnormiranega in s stališča teorije slabo razvitega instituta davčnega izogibanja v Sloveniji in prenormiranega, s strani prakse in teorije zelo bogatega instituta davčnega izogibanja v Nemčiji. Oba zakonodajalca uvajata nove ukrepe proti davčnemu izogibanju, a razlika pri tem je, da slovenski zakonodajalec več kot očitno sledi zgolj ukrepom EU (ki jih mora »pod prisilo« prenesti v nacionalno pravo). Nemški zakonodajalec pa se poleg uvajanja ukrepov EU osredotoča tudi na uvedbo novih nacionalnih ukrepov proti davčnemu izogibanju, do katerih pride na podlagi spremljanja razvoja prakse davčnih in sodnih organov. Pri tem bi se oba zakonodajalca morala zavedati, da novi in vedno bolj kompleksni ukrepi proti davčnemu izogibanju, davčnim zavezancem in njihovim svetovalcem, velikokrat odprejo dodatne in še bolj kreativne načine izvedbe davčnega izogibanja. Slovenski zakonodajalec bi se moral pred oz. poleg uvedbe ukrepov EU, bolj poglobljeno usmeriti v dopolnitev oz. prenovo nacionalne ureditve davčnega izogibanja, medtem ko bi moral biti nemški zakonodajalec precej bolj previden pri snovanju novih norm, saj je veliko specifičnih pravil proti izogibanju davkom vprašljivih z vidika skladnosti nemškega prava s pravom EU.The quote of the famous Benjamin Franklin (1789) »In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.« unquestionably seems convincinghowever, it does not say that these two things fundamentally differ from one another. Namely while death cannot be avoided, taxes can be mitigated in several ways. This is exactly what taxpayers do, both legally and as well as in an unlawful manner. No legislation can regulate all concrete cases, which a taxation can bring. Measures for limiting tax mitigation are increasing on EU as well as national legislation level. Considering all recent publicly known tax affairs, it seems that the taxpayers have currently been more and more striving to avoid the laws, which are currently over-regulated. The reason for this situation could be numerous vague and indefinite legal measures in the field of tax mitigation. The solution may, however, be very well found in simple, clear and specific legal measures against tax mitigation. In Germany, it is possible to notice many positions of theoreticians in the field of taxes, which argue that the taxpayers have the »right« to discretionally choose an adequate legal framework. And if the consequence of such legal framework is the possibility to avoid payment of taxes, the legislator is the only culprit who bears the burden of poor regulation. Of course, this is not always the casenevertheless, the position of German theoreticians in this field is quite different from the one of Slovenian theoreticians. Tax mitigation may not always be illicit, aggressive and unwanted. To some extent, this is a normal and even requested anomaly. The purpose of this work is not to demonstrate how immoral tax mitigation is. It is more of a comparison of the under-regulated and from a theoretical perspective poorly developed institute of tax mitigation institution in Slovenia, viewed from case-law and theory of very ample institute in Germany. Both legislators are enforcing new measures against tax mitigation. Yet the difference is that the Slovenian legislator merely follows the EU measures (which »mandatorily« must be respected in the national law), while the German legislator also focuses on establishing new national measures against tax mitigation, which arise with monitoring the progress of tax and judicial authorities\u27 jurisprudence, all in addition to EU measures. By doing so, both legislators should be aware that new and increasingly complexed measures against tax mitigation, taxpayers and taxpayers’ advisers, often reveal additional and even more creative ways of implementing tax mitigation. The Slovenian legislator should focus more thoroughly on revision and amendments to national regulation of tax mitigation, priory and in addition to EU measures, whereas the German legislator ought to be more cautious with establishing new regulations, since many national tax rules are questionable with regard to compliance with EU law