Add to ORKGOechssler J, Riedel F. Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces. Economic Theory. 2001;7:141-162
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
The usual kinds of Fixed-Point Theorems formalized on the existence of competitive equilibrium that ...
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is ...
SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players have dynamic expectations about the s...
Oechssler J, Riedel F. On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models. Jou...
Clemens C, Riechmann T. Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games. Computational Economics. 2006;28...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
We investigate evolutionary adaptation in a repeated coordination game with strategic uncertainty. ...
This paper focuses on the mathematical core of evolutionary game dynamics. The biologist Maynard Smi...
In this article we will extend the results of [Pri22] to all symetric population games with n strate...
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting ...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
The usual kinds of Fixed-Point Theorems formalized on the existence of competitive equilibrium that ...
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is ...
SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players have dynamic expectations about the s...
Oechssler J, Riedel F. On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models. Jou...
Clemens C, Riechmann T. Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games. Computational Economics. 2006;28...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
We investigate evolutionary adaptation in a repeated coordination game with strategic uncertainty. ...
This paper focuses on the mathematical core of evolutionary game dynamics. The biologist Maynard Smi...
In this article we will extend the results of [Pri22] to all symetric population games with n strate...
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting ...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
The usual kinds of Fixed-Point Theorems formalized on the existence of competitive equilibrium that ...
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is ...