Analyzing the Kantian Amphiboly for the Animals

One of the major abiding challenges for Immanuel Kant’s moral theory has been its apparent inability to account for our duties to animals. Even many Kantians have accepted that if Kant cannot adequately account for such duties, it would be a major black mark for his theory. Kant argues that our duties to animals, those without rational nature, can be only indirect. By, “indirect” he means that duties to animals are a consequence of our direct duties to human beings who have rational natures. The duty in question here is that of improving our moral character. Many argue that common sense tells us we have direct duties to animals to treat them respectfully. This, consequently, raises some questions: is it true that Kant is committed to such prima facie counterintuitive results, and is it correct to say that common sense tells us that we have direct duties to animals? Objectors to Kant argue that one ought to feed a starving dog - simply because the dog deserves to be fed and not only to improve one’s own moral character. Kantians have tried to appease those sympathetic to a direct account of animal rights in one of two ways: find resources within Kant’s theory to yield direct duties to animals, or explain why indirect duties regarding animals is all anyone should ask for. Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood are distinguished Kantians who fall into the former category. In sections 2 and 3, I try to show why their arguments must fail given the constraints of Kant’s normative theory. Any argument issuing in direct duties to animals simply cannot be squared with Kant’s own views. If Kant’s theory cannot account for direct duties to animals, however, this need not undermine his moral theory. Section 4 draws out an attempt by commentator Lara Denis to show how Kant’s own account of indirect duties to animals is rather more compelling than some critics have allowed. In sections 5 and 6, I argue for what I take to be the best version of this sort of account. I then argue, in section 7, that once one has accepted some basic Kantian commitments concerning our moral duties (commitments reinforced by common sense) indirect duties to animals is all we should expect or want. Those who expect otherwise are caught in what some have termed an amphiboly - a confusion about the meaning of terms or concepts concerning Kant’s theory. Kant first proposed the amphiboly reply, and many have supported it. However, many have also rejected it. My own view is that the amphiboly has not been properly analyzed, and my thesis ultimately seeks to clarify the amphiboly itself. With the amphiboly properly analyzed, I contend the black mark will not be seen as a weakness but as a strength.No embargoAcademic Major: Philosoph