Analisis Pengaruh Transaksi Pihak Berelasi dan Koneksi Politik terhadap Kebijakan Dividen Tunai Perusahaan (Studi Empiris pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2011-2013)

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis apakah transaksi pihak berelasi yang dilakukan oleh Perusahaan dan koneksi politik yang dimiliki dengan pembagian kas dividen pada Perusahaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan data panel dengan sampel Perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada periode 2010-2013. Hipotesis penelitian adalah dengan semakin banyaknya transaksi pihak berelasi yang dilakukan oleh Perusahaan, akan semakin sedikit dividen tunai yang dibagikan Perusahaan sedangkan koneksi politik berpengaruh positif terhadap kebijakan dividen Perusahaan. Dari penelitian disimpulkan bahwa dari objek yang diteliti, transaksi pihak berelasi dan koneksi politik berpengaruh terhadap kebijakan pembagian dividen tunai Perusahaan. Kata Kunci: Transaksi Pihak Berelasi; Koneksi Politik; Dividen TunaiThis study using panel data analysis to examine the relationship between related party transaction and political connection on cash dividend policy. 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