Essays on Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions

This dissertation analyzes how relaxing the assumption of rational expectations modifies the output of macroeconomic models. In particularly we show how imperfect information among the financial agents modifies their risk-taking decisions, the effect of monetary policy on banks' lending or equilibrium selection. In the first paper we incorporate a model of the interbank market into a standard DSGE model, with the interbank market rate and the volume of lending depending on market confidence and the perception of counterparty risk. As a result, a credit crunch occurs if the perception of counterparty risk increases. Changes in market confidence then can generate credit crunches and contribute to the depth of recessions. We conduct an exercise to mimic some central bank policies: targeted and untargeted liquidity provision, and reduction of the reserve rate. Our results indicate that policy actions have a limited effect on the supply of credit if they fail to influence agents' expectations. A policy of a low reserve rate worsens recessions due to its negative impact on banks' revenues. Liquidity provision stimulates credit slightly, but its efficiency is undermined by liquidity hoarding. The second paper is devoted to a problem of excessive risk-taking by financial agents. Recent central banks' policies..