「宗教経験からの論証」と観念相対論 : R・スウィンバーンの証拠主義的立場をめぐって

Richard Swinburne, well known for his evidentialist philosophy of religion, attempts in his Existence of God to give foundation to the idea of the existence of God in terms of arguments which use religious experience as evidence. In this paper, I seek to examine Swinburne's understanding of religious experience, especially his "Principle of Credulity" as well as his "perception model" of religious experience. Considered in the wider context of contemporary philosophical discussions on the epistemological value of perceptual experiences, especially those on the conceptual relativity of religious experiences, Swinburne's position presents many difficulties which render his evidentialist arguments hardly tenable. Notwithstanding his foundationalist intention, what he achieves seems to be no more than an invitation to a commitment to the given Christian belief about God. These considerations lead us further into a re-exmination of the foundationalist enterprise in general. There are at least two further tasks to be performed, namely, 1) a reconstruction of the concept of religious experience apart from its narrow evidentialist formulations, and 2 ) historical-genealogical reflections on religious epistemology