Nothing to disagree about: Aristotle, Newton, and the existence of void as seen through a Kuhnian lens

In this work, I argue that a doctrine of theoretic incommensurability, something like that offered by Thomas Kuhn, can be used to to explain the disagreement between Aristotle and Isaac Newton regarding the existence of void. A significant portion of the work is directed at identifying Kuhn’s mature conception of theoretic incommensurability and at diagnosing an apparently serious problem with the account, namely its susceptibility to the charge of epistemological relativism. To combat the charge, I develop an ontology and theory of cognition that can support the Kuhnian thesis without requiring one who prefers the view to accept a strong form of scientific relativism (i.e., scientific subjectivism). Nonetheless, enough conceptual freedom is left to substantiate the incommensurability thesis. Once I have shown that Kuhn's conception is sustainable, I put the theory into action. First, I present the views of both Aristotle and Newton on the existence of void. Then, I show that they diverge in exactly the way that leads to incommensurability according to the Kuhnian account. The end result is that both Aristotle and Newton are shown to have empirically acceptable positions even though they disagree