Norms, status and the dynamics of advice networks : a case study

The issue of the influence of norms on behavior is as old as sociology itself. This paper explores theeffect of normative homophily (i.e. “sharing the same normative choices”) on the evolution of the advicenetwork among lay judges in a courthouse. Blau’s (1955, 1964) social exchange theory suggests thatmembers select advisors based on the status ofthe advisor. Additional research shows that members of anorganization use similarities with others in ascribed, achieved or inherited characteristics, as well as otherkinds of ties, to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this strong status rule. We elaborate and testthese theories using data on advisor choice in the Commercial Court of Paris.We use a jurisprudential caseabout unfair competition (material and “moral” damages), a case that we submitted to allthe judges ofthiscourt, to test the effect of normative homophily on the selection of advisors, controlling for status effects.Normative homophily is measured by the extent to which two judges are equally “punitive” in awardingdamages to plaintiffs. Statistical analyses combine longitudinal advice network data collected amongthe judges with their normative dispositions. Contrary to what could be expected from conventionalsociological theories, we find no pure effect of normative homophily on the choice of advisors. In thiscase, therefore, sharing the same norms and values does not have, by itself, a mitigating effect and doesnot contribute to the evolution ofthe network.We argue that status effects, conformity and alignments onpositions of opinion leaders in controversies still provide the best insights into the relationship betweennorms, structure and behavior