A philosophical evaluation of adaptationism as a heuristic strategy

Adaptationism has for decades been the topic of sophisticated debates in philosophy of biology but\ud methodological adaptationism has not received as much attention as the empirical and explanatory\ud issues. In addition, adaptationism has mainly been discussed in the context of evolutionary biology\ud and not in fields such as zoophysiology and systems biology where this heuristic is also used in design\ud analyses of physiological traits and molecular structures. This paper draws on case studies from these\ud fields to discuss the productive and problematic aspects of this heuristic in different research\ud practices, in functional as well as evolutionary studies on different levels of biological organization.\ud Gould and Lewontin’s Spandrels-paper famously criticized adaptationist methodology for implying\ud the risk of generating ‘blind spots’ with respect to non-selective effects on evolution. Some have\ud claimed that this bias can be accommodated through the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. Although\ud this is an important aspect of overcoming naïve adaptationism, I argue that the issue of\ud methodological biases is broader than the question of testability. I demonstrate the productivity of\ud adaptationist heuristics but also discuss the deeper problematic aspects associated with the\ud methodological imperialism that is part of the strong adaptationist position