The blind monks and the elephant : contrasting narratives of financial crisis

Three persuasive narratives of the US subprime crisis are explored with reference both to theory and to emergency acts of public policy undertaken. First the role of pecuniary externalities that amplify any shocks to the quality of risk-assets held by Investment Banks and others. Second is adverse selection in marketing these assets; and third the role of financial panic in making investment-banking disaster-prone. How relevant these differing perspectives proved is attested by the nature of state support and by subsequent findings in courts of law. As Chair of the US Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen argued that vulnerabilities within the US financial system in the mid-2000s were “numerous and familiar from past financial panics”. That the varied threats to stability featuring in these narratives should be complements and not substitutes is of more than technical interest: it helps to explain why the US financial system was so exposed to radical failure