Revising Just War Theory : towards a more inclusive account of justice

M.A. (Philosophy)Abstract: Just War Theory (JWT) helps theorists and politicians assess how just a war is, by assessing its outcomes, aims and viable alternatives. Politicians/theorists may apply the principles of JWT to judge whether states should wage war and how they should fight it. Recent additions to theory also help judge whether and how to conclude wars. Nevertheless, political and military decision-makers may apply the principles of JWT in a way that justifies and enables unjust wars. I define unjust wars as those that harm the innocent. What is novel about my account of just war is my definition of innocence as a lack of contribution to unjust harm. My focus on innocence and our need to value and protect it better is my basis for revising JWT. I argue that wars and JWT have largely failed the innocent. This failure was aided by specific (mis)conceptions of justice as comprising benefits to specific empires/states/soldiers. I attribute this misconception to the importance of the principles of just cause and proper authority; specific formulations of these empowered leaders instead of limiting them. This need not have been the case as JWT has always included good formulations of principles like proportionality and right intention, which seek to limit harmful outcomes of war and the dispositions that encourage harm. JWT has also rested on the notion of protecting the innocent by punishing the guilty. However, focusing on gaining benefits for the state/empire may detract from the aim of protecting the innocent. This indicates not only the importance of the state and its protection as a political value but also the impossibility of state legitimacy. If states do not seek their constituents‘ input, this potentially invalidates all their policies and practices, especially war. Furthermore, if the effect of war is disproportionate harm to the innocent, without a reasonable expectation of their future safety and value, it is unjust. However, this does not render a proportionate outcome immediately praiseworthy, as the judgment of a war‘s impact should be qualified by a judgment of its intentions. If a war does not protect and promote the value of innocent life, based on an intention to improve that life and a corresponding recognition of its value, it is unjust. If a war prevents people from valuing themselves and each other, I can only conclude that it costs them and this adds to the judgment of proportionality. Additionally, failing to communicate the values, intentions and outcomes that arise from war makes it difficult to assess the legitimacy of state wars and their rationale. Therefore, the decisions about war and their expected outcomes should be open to the public in a much wider sense; not just to local constituents but also to the international community. This may foster help and solutions that states take for granted when they are desperate to ensure their own survival