Add to ORKGPower indices methodology of weighted majority game is widely used to measure a priori voting power of members of a committee. In this paper we present a computer implementation of the main power indices: Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan-Packel and the Holler- Packel power indices. This computer implementation allows comparing the different indices. The system was developed for multiplataform: Linux and Windows. We compute the power indices for two examples and analyze its results.Eje: VI Workshop de Agentes y Sistemas Inteligentes (WASI)Red de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI
Voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting bod...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...
Power indices methodology of weighted majority game is widely used to measure a priori voting power ...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing ...
Based on Holler (1982), Colomer and Martínez (1995), and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021), we propose two ...
Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting bod...
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzha...
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzha...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
Voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting bod...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...
Power indices methodology of weighted majority game is widely used to measure a priori voting power ...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing ...
Based on Holler (1982), Colomer and Martínez (1995), and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021), we propose two ...
Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting bod...
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzha...
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzha...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
Voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting bod...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting bo...