The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent
Friedman (1971) proved the existence of a balanced temptation equilibrium in which each player has s...
AbstractIt is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions po...
This article investigates contests when heterogeneous players compete to obtain a share of a prize. ...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The supp...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is...
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative n...
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if ...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for paramete...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
In this paper, we present a contest success function (CSF), which is homogeneous of degree zero and ...
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock...
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a ...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
We study Tullock’s (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent prob-ability 0 < p...
We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discrim...
Friedman (1971) proved the existence of a balanced temptation equilibrium in which each player has s...
AbstractIt is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions po...
This article investigates contests when heterogeneous players compete to obtain a share of a prize. ...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The supp...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is...
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative n...
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if ...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for paramete...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
In this paper, we present a contest success function (CSF), which is homogeneous of degree zero and ...
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock...
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a ...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
We study Tullock’s (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent prob-ability 0 < p...
We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discrim...
Friedman (1971) proved the existence of a balanced temptation equilibrium in which each player has s...
AbstractIt is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions po...
This article investigates contests when heterogeneous players compete to obtain a share of a prize. ...
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