Aristotle’s Secundum quid and Accident fallacies. Their fore-predicative interpretation and illustration by division

Through the recognition of the principle of distinction and its fore-predicative implications the extra-linguistic fallacies of secundum quid and accident, proposed by Aristotle in the Sophistici Elenchi, will be explained, proved, analyzed and solved. Thus, it is postulated that the fallacies presented by Aristotle in this book are rooted in a false fore-predicative consideration and not in the paralogism. This consideration will open a new way of analyzing Aristotle’s fallacies. With this, we will prove that the analysis of the fallacies as paralogisms is posterior, for we will stand by the thesis that states that the fallacy is generated in the ontological fore-predicative distinction level and not at the linguistic level of reasoning. A divisive model that provides information to the inclusive model of traditional logic is proposed in the way that it allows us to take account of the principle of distinction