Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.Grant PTDC/EGEECO/100696/2008 of the Ministry of Science and Technolog
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the pres...
We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system...
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. The model assumes ine...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this jo...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joi...
Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this join...
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommun...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) has gathered much...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network prov...
We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile telephony, with and without strategic pricing...
We present a structural model to investigate the effects of horizontal cooperation on investment in ...
This paper examines the influence of mobile network competition on the prices of fixed-to-mobile cal...
This paper studies the effect of termination rates on substitution between fixed and mobile calls an...
We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externa...
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the pres...
We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system...
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. The model assumes ine...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this jo...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joi...
Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this join...
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommun...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) has gathered much...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network prov...
We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile telephony, with and without strategic pricing...
We present a structural model to investigate the effects of horizontal cooperation on investment in ...
This paper examines the influence of mobile network competition on the prices of fixed-to-mobile cal...
This paper studies the effect of termination rates on substitution between fixed and mobile calls an...
We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externa...
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the pres...
We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system...
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. The model assumes ine...