Un mondo di eventi

The dissertation’s starting point is the intuitive distinction between events, conceived of as things that happen, and material objects, conceived of as things that participate in events. This distinction raises two connected metaphysical questions: how can the relation of being involved in which holds between material objects and events be adequately characterized? Which is the relation of being ontologically prior than which holds between material objects and events? The Thesis “A World of Events” tries to give an answer to such questions in seven chapters. In Chapter 1 necessary and plausibly jointly sufficient conditions will be established for identifying, respectively, an entity as a material object or as an event. The fundamental questions which have justified this research presuppose the existence of events; however, some arguments in literature have been put forth against the existence of such a kind of entities. In the first part of Chapter 2 the arguments against the existence of events advanced by Aune (1977) and Horgan (1978) will be examined. Thereafter, an argumentative strategy for blocking those arguments will be devised. The subject of Chapeter 3 is the notion of ontological priority. In the first part of the chapter some requirements will be provided which every adequate characterization of the notion of ontological priority has to satisfy. Afterwards, a characterization of the notions of ontological priority and ontological dependence which are based on Fine’s (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) and Correia’s (2006) works and which satisfy the requirements settled for the notion of ontological priority will be developed. In the literature some arguments have been designed aiming at providing some constraints which the adequate theories of events have to fulfil. In Chapter 4 such constraints are summed up in two requirements: requirement R1), according to which a material object is an entity which participates in events: a material object enters as a participant in events through which it always remains the same; and requirement R2), according to which events ontologically depend upon the material objects which participate in them. In Chapters 5 and 6 two theories which plausibly satisfy such requirements will be examined: the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations and the theory of events as particular and non-substantial ways of being. Particularly, in Chapter 5 two objections raised against the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations will be considered and a new version of this theory of events which blocks these objections will be proposed. In the first part of Chapter 7 the validity of requirements R1) and R2) and the correctness of the arguments whence requirements R1) and R2) have been derived will be questioned. Subsequently, the plausibility of a theory of events which fails to satisfy requirements R1) and R2) will be inquired: Quine’s theory of events. This theory of events identifies events and material objects. The argumentative strategy is as follows: first of all, two theoretical costs of Quine’s theory will be highlighted; then Quine’s theory will be defended against an objection proposed by Paul (2000)