The Australian Senate 1901-1972

The Australian Senate has proved to be somewhat of an enigma within the institutional framework of Australian federalism. It was the subject of intensive debate at the Federal Conventions of the 1890s; and the Founding Fathers envisaged that it would perform the dual functions of a House of Review and a States House . This thesis describes pre-federation expectations about the Senate and Senators - expectations which even at that time were somewhat naive and over-optimistic. Detailed examination of both the membership and the legislative record of the Chamber for a seventy-two year period demonstrates that neither Senators nor the activity of the Chamber fulfilled those expectations. Most Founding Fathers expected that the Senate would be a key focus for Federal-State interaction and that Senators would promote and protect States' interests. This has not been the case, partly because effective power within the Australian federation has progressively shifted from the State to the Federal level of government; and partly because neither State nor Federal governments have accepted that the Senate or the Federal Parliament is the arena within which inter-governmental relations should be pursued or examined. Nor have Senators regarded the States House function as a, let alone the, important area of Senate activity. The Senate is seen to have performed more effectively as a House of Review than as a States House. Yet there have been noticeable variations in the nature of Senate scrutiny (of both legislation and of the executive) over the seventy-two year period. Acceptance of the conventions of cabinet government has led to a general disinclination by Senators to take full advantage of the extensive legislative powers the Constitution grants to the Chamber. A major explanation for the uneven record of the Senate as a House of Review is the influence of party politics. Senators have seen themselves as pre-eminently party men; and their political allegiance has determined the manner in which legislative review and executive scrutiny has occurred. Political parties have also exacted a loyalty from Senators that competes with and generally supercedes any committment to the welfare of State interests. Observers outside the Chamber have noted these developments; but rarely has criticism of the performance of the Senate been accompanied by calls for the restructuring, or even the abolition, of the Chamber. To some degree the Senate's caution, given its Constitutional powers, explains electoral unwillingness to sanction reforms