Desert and punishment

As far back as Plato we find raised and considered most of the ethical problems relating to punishment. Time has diminished neither their relevance nor their problematic nature. Yet the problems have not always been exactly the same - more like variations on a theme, the variations provided by somewhat differing conceptions of punishment, and the theme being the just if icat ion of punishment. Punishment is sarid to stand in need of justification. Whether this is an unambiguous or even a proper way of speaking I shall consider later. For the time being I shall be concerned with the notion of justification, as justifications for punishment have often been sought without there being any clear idea as to the conditions under which justificatory questions arise and in what justifications consist. As will soon become obvious, these are considerable problems in themselves, claiming more attention than can be given them in the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is essential that we at least enter into the problems