Superpower involvement in the horn of Africa, 1974-1982

For the past 25 years, the Horn of Africa has been a microcosm of the tensions that beset the world. Domestic, regional and global forces have impinged on the the Horn's international politics. Somali irredentism has threatened to alter the regional territorial status quo. It also has largely been blamed for the conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, on the one hand, and between Kenya and Somalia, on the other. Somali irredentism and the Eritrean struggle for secession have constituted Ethiopia's main internal problem and have also had a big impact on Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours. Actors external to the region have also tried to exert influence in the region. Middle Eastern countries, namely Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic have supported one side or the other in the Horn. The Soviet Union and the United States also have established a presence in the region. The USSR had a military presence in Somalia between 1953 and 1977. Since then, it has had close political and military ties with Ethiopia. The US had a military communications station in Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977. It acquired in 1980 access to military facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The involvement of the superpowers in the Horn between 1974 and 1982 was characterised by considerable competition and little cooperation. Although the policies of detente emphasised cooperation, the Soviet Union and the United States competed over the allegiance of Ethiopia and Somalia. They cooperated briefly in 1977 in the Indian Ocean arms limitation talks, but their attempts to supplant each other in the Horn, and in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, smacked of Cold War rivalry. Competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Horn and the Persian Gulf region acquired a new momentum following a succession of events in 1979: the fall from power of the Shah of Iran in January; the taking of American embassy personnel as hostages in Tehran in November; and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December. Those situations prompted the United States to establish in March 1980 a Rapid Deployment Force (later renamed Central Command). The motive behind the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force was to demonstrate the American resolve and readiness to intervene swiftly in the Persian Gulf in the event of a threat to vital American interests. While the force was equipped to deal with some local contingencies, it did not appear adequate to deal with instability that might result from unequal distribution of wealth, corruption and many other problems associated with modernisation in the Horn/Persian Gulf region. Soviet and American assistance programmes have benefited the local states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Ethiopia relied on Soviet and Cuban support to regain the territory which Somalia had occupied during the 1977-78 Ogaden war. Kenya used its connection with the United States and Britain to ask these countries and other Western nations to refrain from arming Somalia during the war. And Somalia utilised American military aid after 1980 to revamp its military force which had been weakened and demoralised in the Ogaden war. In spite of the Soviet and American aid programmes in the Horn, the superpowers did not exercise decisive influence on the decision-making processes in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. These countries often pursued their own goals irrespective of what the superpowers desired