Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock-return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-takin
Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that ...
textabstractThis paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed t...
This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial instit...
This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking in...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitiv...
I examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure ge...
This paper provides evidence that insurance executives respond to their compensation incentives by a...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitiv...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by e...
This paper provides evidence that insurance executives respond to their compensation incentives by a...
In this study, we show that the option-like structure of equity-based compensation encourages manage...
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to ...
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to ...
This study examines whether CEO equity incentives have an impact on audit pricing. Prior studies inv...
Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that ...
textabstractThis paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed t...
This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial instit...
This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking in...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitiv...
I examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure ge...
This paper provides evidence that insurance executives respond to their compensation incentives by a...
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitiv...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by e...
This paper provides evidence that insurance executives respond to their compensation incentives by a...
In this study, we show that the option-like structure of equity-based compensation encourages manage...
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to ...
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to ...
This study examines whether CEO equity incentives have an impact on audit pricing. Prior studies inv...
Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that ...
textabstractThis paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed t...
This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial instit...
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