Toleration

The two parts of this thesis are directed to one question: Whether the principles of Toleration are morally binding. The first part states what those principles are; the second examines several arguments meant to show that they are morally binding. In the first part I have aimed at completeness, but the second part does not purport to be a complete treatment of the reasons for Toleration, still less of the reasons that seem to some people to require or justify intolerance. Chapter 3, in Part II, discusses how one decides when a question has been investigated sufficiently, and whether one can rationally assert anything before such an investigation is complete. But in fact my conclusion does not make any large assertions. In Part I I have tried to formulate all the principles of Toleration as exactly as I can - I hope the result is not tedious. Some of the principles I deal with may fall outside what is ordinarily meant by Toleration: some people might prefer to call some of them principles of religious liberty, or of state neutrality in ideological matters, or of moral freedom. No single term covers the whole set, though I believe they all belong together. In formulating them I have tried to do justice to the subtle way these principles are balanced against competing ideals and interests. I have tried also to make it clear that Toleration need not involve relativism, subjectivism, scepticism, indifference to truth, or passivity toward mistaken opinions or harmful actions. Part I tacitly disposes of a number of common objections which arise from an unsympathetic conception of what Toleration is. The literature on Toleratio~ is very extensive, and I have had to read selectively On the hypothesis that Anglo-American liberalism, ane the liberalism of the French Enlightenment, are paradigmatic for liberalism generally, I gave priority to English and American and eighteenth century French writers: and I must confess I had little time to read much else. Of the French writers, Bayle, whose Commentaire philosophigue deserves to be well known, is the only one who helped me much. I have the impression that his successors found little left to say; it is noteworthy that the article Tolerance in Diderot's Encyclopedie ends with a laudatory reference to Bayle, from whom its arguments are obviously derived. Voltaire's writings on Toleration I found disappointing. I am grateful to my supervisors, S.I. Benn and Professor P.H. Partridge; to Marie Adamson for the care she has taken with the typing; to the members of our work in progress seminar, especially E. Curley, B. Maund, G. Mortimore, and R. Naulty. From Stanley Benn in particular I have learned a lot, and I enjoyed learning it. my thanks are due to my wife, Anne