Are proposition-entities the objects of the propositional attitudes?

In this thesis I examine the proposal that proposition entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes in the sense that they are what we believe, doubt, desire, etc. As a corollary of this, I also examine the proposal that proposition-entities are the objects of such acts of speech as asserting or stating in the sense that they are what we assert or state. So as to present the best side of these proposals, which I do not view favourably, I attempt to give an account of, and draw together, what I believe are the main arguments and assumptions that are endemic to them. But there are a number of theories that dispute the validity of holding that what we believe, doubt, desire,assert, state, etc., are proposition-entities. Might not one of these theories prove to be more viable? I attempt to answer this question, at least in part, by critically discussing what I take to be the major theories of this kind. First up, some theories that substitute other types of entities for propositions are looked at. These include theories that appeal to facts (e.g., Broad, and to a lesser degree, Anderson), multiple objects (e.g.,Russell, Woozley, and Geach), sentences (e.g., Carnapians), and inscriptions (e.g. Scheffler). A theory by A.R. White which partly retains and partly rejects proposition-entities is also considered. I then assess some major theories that deny that proposition-entities or entities of any other type are objects of the attitudes. These theories include the 'believes that' analysis {Prior and Quine), the paratactic analysis {Davidson), some forms of behaviourism {e.g., Russell, Braithwaite, and Ayer), adverbial analysis {e.g., Aune, Ziff, and Sellars), and a theory by Searle which eschews proposition-entities as objects of the attitudes, but retains them in an innocuous sense. A more radical approach is to deny that there are such things as propositional attitudes. Stephen Stitch drifts towards this view, and I examine his position. Finally, I evaluate some recent arguments of Perry and Fodor that are of relevance. All these theories, with the exception of those of Perry and Fodor, contain serious, particular flaws which I try to draw out. In some cases an attempt is also made to ascertain whether there is an underlying problem with, for example, the type of analysis or paraphrase used. I also draw attention to some problems that any theory of the propositional attitudes would have to face, such as providing an analysis or treatment of 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not', and eventually make some suggestions of my own in this regard. In the final Chapter I attempt to show by appealing to certain paraphrases that neither proposition-entities nor entities of any other type are objects of the attitudes or speech acts. I defend the type of paraphrase used, and explain why it does not succumb to certain objections that were previously raised