The division and destruction of the Xiongnu Confederacy in the first and second centuries AD

For more than three hundred years after the great Shanyu Modun [or Maodun], at the end of the third century BC, the Xiongnu dominated the steppe-lands north of China, and contended for influence in central Asia. Other contributors consider the earlier history of the state, and its rivalry with the Chinese dynasty of Former Han; the present paper deals with the decline and fall of the Xiongnu during the first two centuries AD, at the time of the Later Han dynasty. The overwhelming amount of information on the people and their rulers comes from Chinese sources, which are for the most part predictably hostile. Few words are recorded of the Xiongnu language, and small confidence can be placed on transcription from their alien speech through ancient Chinese to the present day. The Chinese term "Xiongnu" presumably reflects the sound of the foreign tongue; though identification has often been suggested the name need not be related to that of the later Huns who afflicted Europe centuries later. Like other steppe regimes, the Xiongnu government was a family affair, with authority in the hands of the royal house and a limited number of clans related by marriage. The name of the state came from the royal tribe, while outside clans and tribes of the steppe were held in submission by the threat of force and by largesse from the leadership, frequently acquired by trade or warfare with the settled people of China As Lattimore argued in 1940, the development of the Xiongnu state reflected tensions on the frontier as the Qin and Han dynasties of China consolidated their power. On the one hand, the people of the steppe were threatened by the expansion of the Chinese empire in the north, but at the same time the products of China offered opportunities of wealth and luxury far beyond those available in the grasslands. Much of the history of the Xiongnu state can be seen as a reaction to Chinese encroachment, combined with the desire to obtain goods either by trade or by war. For their part, the emperors of China sought to dominate the northern regions by controlling the trading outlets and, of comparable importance, ensuring that the peoples either side of the limes were kept apart. Besides its obvious function of military defence and warning, the Great Wall of Qin and Former Han was an excellent instrument for these purposes, and though much of the fortification was left unmanned by Later Han the policies of separation of people and restriction of trade were sought by other means. A major concern of the Xiongnu rulers was to gain access to the wealth of China and thus maintain their authority over other peoples of the steppe; and they pursued this policy through regular trade, through the exchange of official gifts often a disguised tribute or by actual or threatened warfare. Their power depended very largely upon the relationship with China, and the structure of their state was not sophisticated. At the same time, it was to Chinese advantage that this foreign state should be maintained in control of peoples and regions beyond the reach of imperial arms and government. During the first century AD, however, division among the Xiongnu leadership and over-ambition at the court of Han destroyed the balance and brought disorder and disintegration