[[alternative]]The Relationship between Grant effect of Executive Stock Options and Firm Performance

碩士商業教育學系[[abstract]]本文主要探討員工認股權證的發行效果對於盈餘管理及公司真實財務績效之影響。由於員工認股權證制度中有二年的閉鎖期尚不能執行，因此本文將授予高階經理人的員工認股權價值之誘因比率(Incentive ratio)分為被授予當年、被授予後一年及可執行當年總共三個部分。本研究藉由高階經理人的報償誘因以探討實施員工認股權證制度是否會引起高階經理人進行盈餘管理之行為；再者，由於員工認股權證制度將員工激勵誘因與公司利潤結合可增進公司表面績效，但是對於公司真實財務績效是否具有正面的激勵效果或者產生不利於公司的負面影響結果。實證結果顯示實施員工認股權證之制度，增進高階經理人從事盈餘操弄行為之誘因。此外，亦發現在可執行當年的員工認股權證對於公司真實財務績效具有正面影響，表示員工認股權證制度確實有激勵員工的效果，進而提升公司真實財務績效。[[abstract]]This paper was focused on the executive stock option (ESO) granted effect on earnings management and firm unmanaged performance. Because the regulation of ESO that ESO did not exercise in two years vesting period, we separated the executives’ incentive ratio of ESO valuation into three parts, the granted year、the year after granted year and the exercised year. Our research used executives’ compensation incentive to investigate whether the ESO leaded executives to engage in earnings management or not, and whether the ESO leaded firm’s unmanaged performance better or not. The empirical result showed the ESO really leaded executives to engage in earnings management. Besides, the ESO in the excised year was positive in firm unmanaged performance, this evidence also showed the ESO was really to encourage employees and raise firm unmanaged performance