Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel We consider the sales of a good that produces external effects between the buyers in that an individual buyer is not indifferent as to whether or not the good is sold or whether it comes to be owned by a competitor. This paper reviews several articles dealing with this topic and shows how externalities can explain such phenomena as buyers' strategic behaviour at auctions, the seller's ability to get money from agents who will not buy the good and stalling in negotiations. We also deal briefly with cases where the good being acquired may be resold.Enchères et externalités par Philippe Jehiel On considère la vente d'un bien induisant des effets externes entre acheteurs au sens où un acheteur n'e...
We analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security-bid auction in which: (i) the allo...
This paper studies how bidding strategies and auction outcomes are affected by downstream competitio...
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and re...
Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel We consider the sales of a good that produces externa...
Coexistence of identity-specific and financial externalities among bidders is a salient feature of a...
<p>This dissertation focuses on understanding how negative externalities affect managerial decisions...
This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems. The first two chapters ...
© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature. We scrutinize the scope of auctions f...
Nous étudions la question de la collusion dans les enchères. Nous commençons par présenter un modèle...
An auction is said to be externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the rema...
This dissertation consists of three papers. A common feature of these papers is the interest in how ...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
We consider an auction setting in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about th...
In this paper, we study the seller-optimal auctions for auction design environments with pure inform...
International audienceThe usual internalization of externality ‘by the market’ can be thought of thr...
We analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security-bid auction in which: (i) the allo...
This paper studies how bidding strategies and auction outcomes are affected by downstream competitio...
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and re...
Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel We consider the sales of a good that produces externa...
Coexistence of identity-specific and financial externalities among bidders is a salient feature of a...
<p>This dissertation focuses on understanding how negative externalities affect managerial decisions...
This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems. The first two chapters ...
© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature. We scrutinize the scope of auctions f...
Nous étudions la question de la collusion dans les enchères. Nous commençons par présenter un modèle...
An auction is said to be externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the rema...
This dissertation consists of three papers. A common feature of these papers is the interest in how ...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
We consider an auction setting in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about th...
In this paper, we study the seller-optimal auctions for auction design environments with pure inform...
International audienceThe usual internalization of externality ‘by the market’ can be thought of thr...
We analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security-bid auction in which: (i) the allo...
This paper studies how bidding strategies and auction outcomes are affected by downstream competitio...
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and re...