A novel theory called bi-default theory is proposed for handling inconsistent knowledge simultaneously in the context of default logic without leading to triviality of the extension. To this end, the positive and negative transformations of prepositional formulas are defined such that the semantic link between a literal and its negation is split. Most theorems of default logic can be reproduced in the setting of the bi-default logic. It is proven that the bi-default logic is a generalization of the default logic in the presence of inconsistency. A method is provided as an alternative approach for making the reasoning ability of paraconsistent logic as powerful as the classical one.EI071030-10411
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
Abstract. We present a bi-valued semantics for default logic appealing to maximal sets, instead of a...
Reiter's default logic can not tolerate contradictions in default theories. In the paper we mod...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
In this paper we propose a semantics for default theories, based on van Gelder's alternating fi...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
In this paper, we investigate the proof theory of default reasoning. We generalize Reiter's fra...
Most of the work in default logic is about default theories that are completely specified. In this c...
Reiter's default logic is supposed to reasoning on consistent knowledge; when inconsistencies o...
We define a logic of default justifications that relies on operational semantics. One of the key fea...
AbstractIn previous papers some important properties of extensions of general default theories were ...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
Abstract. We present a bi-valued semantics for default logic appealing to maximal sets, instead of a...
Reiter's default logic can not tolerate contradictions in default theories. In the paper we mod...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
In this paper we propose a semantics for default theories, based on van Gelder's alternating fi...
International audienceThe paper investigates the relation between inconsistencytolerant semantics (A...
In this paper, we investigate the proof theory of default reasoning. We generalize Reiter's fra...
Most of the work in default logic is about default theories that are completely specified. In this c...
Reiter's default logic is supposed to reasoning on consistent knowledge; when inconsistencies o...
We define a logic of default justifications that relies on operational semantics. One of the key fea...
AbstractIn previous papers some important properties of extensions of general default theories were ...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...
In many situations humans have to reason with inconsistent knowledge. These inconsistencies may occu...