Most of previous studies concerning the public goods game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social institutions, affects the evolution of cooperation is still unclear. We propose a model where individuals with heterogeneous social ties might well engage in differing numbers of public goods games, yet with each public goods game being constant size during the course of evolution. To do this, we assume that each focal individual unidirectionally selects a constant number of interaction partners from his immediate neighbors with probabilities proportional to the degrees or the reputations of these neighbors, corresp...
This paper studies the effect of experience, the inter-temporal strategy and the group size as the p...
Previous studies of games on dynamic graphs have almost specified pairwise interactions using the pr...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease ov...
Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of ...
Most previous investigations on spatial Public Goods Game assume that individuals treat neighbors eq...
Encouraging cooperation among selfish individuals is crucial in many real-world systems, where indiv...
In most previous studies of public goods game, individuals conventionally donate their contributions...
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. There is evidence that individuals are oft...
Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has be...
Inspired by the fact that opportunities in reality are heterogeneous for individuals due to social s...
Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolutio...
This paper studies the effect of experience, the inter-temporal strategy and the group size as the p...
Previous studies of games on dynamic graphs have almost specified pairwise interactions using the pr...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease ov...
Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of ...
Most previous investigations on spatial Public Goods Game assume that individuals treat neighbors eq...
Encouraging cooperation among selfish individuals is crucial in many real-world systems, where indiv...
In most previous studies of public goods game, individuals conventionally donate their contributions...
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. There is evidence that individuals are oft...
Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has be...
Inspired by the fact that opportunities in reality are heterogeneous for individuals due to social s...
Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolutio...
This paper studies the effect of experience, the inter-temporal strategy and the group size as the p...
Previous studies of games on dynamic graphs have almost specified pairwise interactions using the pr...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...