Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games

In most previous studies of public goods game, individuals conventionally donate their contributions equally to the games they participate in. We develop an extended public goods game model, in which individuals distribute their contributions based on the groups' qualities. Namely, the individuals are allowed to increase their investment to the superior groups at the expense of the nasty ones. The quality of a group is positively correlated with its cooperation level. In numerical simulations, synchronized stochastic strategy updating rule based on pairwise comparison for a fixed noise level is adopted. The results show that the high-quality group preference mechanism can greatly improve cooperation, compared with conventional models. Besides, the system with stronger preference toward high-quality groups performs better. Investigation of wealth distribution at equilibrium reveals that cooperators' wealth appreciates with the increase of preference degree when cooperators take up the same fraction of the population. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000279834400016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=8e1609b174ce4e31116a60747a720701Physics, MultidisciplinarySCI(E)19ARTICLE163166-317138