The dynamics of innocent flesh on the bone: Code reuse ten years later

In 2007, Shacham published a seminal paper on Return-Oriented Programming (ROP), the first systematic formulation of code reuse. The paper has been highly influential, profoundly shaping the way we still think about code reuse today: An attacker analyzes the "ge-ometry" of victim binary code to locate gadgets and chains these to craft an exploit. This model has spurred much research, with a rapid progression of increasingly sophisticated code reuse attacks and defenses over time. After ten years, the common perception is that state-of-the-art code reuse defenses are effective in signifi-cantly raising the bar and making attacks exceedingly hard. In this paper, we challenge this perception and show that an at-tacker going beyond "geometry" (static analysis) and considering the "dynamics" (dynamic analysis) of a victim program can easily find function call gadgets even in the presence of state-of-the-art code-reuse defenses. To support our claims, we present Newton, a run-time gadget-discovery framework based on constraint-driven dynamic taint analysis. Newton can model a broad range of de-fenses by mapping their properties into simple, stackable, reusable constraints, and automatically generate gadgets that comply with these constraints. Using Newton, we systematically map and com-pare state-of-the-art defenses, demonstrating that even simple in-teractions with popular server programs are adequate for finding gadgets for all state-of-the-art code-reuse defenses. We conclude with an nginx case study, which shows that a Newton-enabled attacker can craft attacks which comply with the restrictions of advanced defenses, such as CPI and context-sensitive CFI