Constructing Kallipolis: The Political Argument of Plato's Socratic Dialogues

This dissertation examines the political argument of Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Common interpretations of these texts suggest, variously: (1) that Socrates does not offer much in the way of a political theory; (2) that Socrates does reflect on politics but ultimately rejects political institutions as irrelevant to his ethical concerns; (3) that Socrates arrives at a political theory that either accepts or even celebrates free and democratic political arrangements. Against such interpretations, this dissertation examines Plato’s early work and demonstrates: (1’) that Socrates does engage in serious reflection on political institutions and on the question of the best regime; (2’) that Socrates recognizes that political institutions are of central importance to his ethical concerns; (3’) that Socrates rejects democracy, specifically, or political and cultural freedom, generally, as tending to corrupt the citizenry and lead to misery rather than happiness. In the Socratic dialogues, then, we find Plato intentionally “constructing Kallipolis,” one argument at a time. 1. The first essay examines the Charmides and Socrates’ argument there that it is impossible for an amateur to ever reliably distinguish between experts and non-experts in a knowledge that she does not herself possess. This argument poses a fundamental challenge to democracy, which relies on the ability of amateurs to reliably select good rulers, but the argument does not license such revolutionary action as Socrates’ interlocutors Critias and Charmides would historically undertake. 2. The second essay examines the Gorgias, seeking to understand one of Socrates’ favorite paradoxes: that doing wrong makes the wrongdoer miserable. The essay demonstrates that Socrates’ contention is supported by an argument about appetite and psychological self-harm that anticipates the more elaborate theory of the Republic. This argument, and especially the thought that the wrongdoer’s judgment comes to be seriously distorted by her vice, provides a moral-psychological explanation of the difficulty of reforming a corrupt culture and suggests the value, on Socrates’ account, of non-rational forms of persuasion. 3. The third essay examines the Protagoras and its attack on sophistry. The dialogue argues that any free society will tend toward corruption, on account of the operation of unscrupulous clever speakers who aim to disrupt traditional morality. The solution to this problem is suggested in Socrates sketch of a “philosophical Sparta,” a regime that anticipates the Kallipolis of the Republic in many respects, especially in the strict control of poetry (i.e., the rejection of political and cultural freedom). Considered together, these three essays show that Plato’s Socrates is no democrat. From the beginning he looks toward a radically new kind of politics, an unfree society ruled by a philosophical elite.Governmen