A Nash equilibrium (called an “equilibrium point” by John Nash himself; see Nash 1950) of a game occurs when each player chooses a strategy from which unilateral deviations do not pay. The concept of Nash equilibrium is far and away Nash’s most important legacy to economics and the other behavioral sciences. This is because it remains the central solution concept—i.e., prediction of behavior—in applications of game theory to these fields. As I shall review below, Nash equilibrium has some important shortcomings, both theoretical and practical. I will argue, however, that these drawbacks are far less troublesome in problems of mechanism design than in many other applications of game theory.Mathematic
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of t...
It is argued here that the Nash equilibrium calculated by Gradus (1989) is not the Nash equilibrium ...
This paper studies the identification power of rationalizability in a simple dynamic discrete game m...
I argue that the principal theoretical and practical drawbacks of Nash equilibrium as a solution con...
John F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph.D. Dissertation entitled Non-cooperative games to Princeton Univ...
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed...
This thesis introduces, as major contribution, a new definition of strategically stable set of equil...
Starting from John Nash's pioneering ideas, the paper examines from the viewpoint of the history of ...
Game theory is often used to explain behavior. Such explanations often proceed by demonstrating that...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equi...
The paper by Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Elie Tamer clari\u85es how identi\u85cation can be obtained ...
Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, d...
In 1994, John Forbes Nash Jr received the Nobel Prize in Economics for a one-page note published in ...
There are various other ways in which the Nash equilibrium concept has been motivated with game theo...
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of t...
It is argued here that the Nash equilibrium calculated by Gradus (1989) is not the Nash equilibrium ...
This paper studies the identification power of rationalizability in a simple dynamic discrete game m...
I argue that the principal theoretical and practical drawbacks of Nash equilibrium as a solution con...
John F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph.D. Dissertation entitled Non-cooperative games to Princeton Univ...
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed...
This thesis introduces, as major contribution, a new definition of strategically stable set of equil...
Starting from John Nash's pioneering ideas, the paper examines from the viewpoint of the history of ...
Game theory is often used to explain behavior. Such explanations often proceed by demonstrating that...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equi...
The paper by Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Elie Tamer clari\u85es how identi\u85cation can be obtained ...
Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, d...
In 1994, John Forbes Nash Jr received the Nobel Prize in Economics for a one-page note published in ...
There are various other ways in which the Nash equilibrium concept has been motivated with game theo...
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of t...
It is argued here that the Nash equilibrium calculated by Gradus (1989) is not the Nash equilibrium ...
This paper studies the identification power of rationalizability in a simple dynamic discrete game m...