We present a model of judgment under uncertainty, in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. We focus on what comes to mind immediately, as the agent makes quick, intuitive evaluations. Because the automatic retrieval of data from memory is both limited and selected, the agent's evaluations may be severely biased. This framework can account for some of the evidence on heuristics and biases presented by Kahneman and Tversky, including conjunction and disjunction fallacies.Economic
We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking, ” in which an agent combines data...
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventu...
Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes contradictory, deviations f...
We present a model of judgment under uncertainty, in which an agent combines data received from the ...
Kahneman’s latest work takes us one step closer to understanding flaws in human decision making. Pol...
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventu...
The present work describes the model of heuristic judgment of Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and two ex...
New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of “dual pr...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
Information stored in memory influences the formation of preferences and beliefs in most everyday de...
The paper conducts the collective specification of fallacies in the perception of reality made by ma...
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during...
The paper conducts the collective specification of fallacies in the perception of reality made by ma...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
How and when are individuals more or less influenced by heuristics when making judgments? The first...
We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking, ” in which an agent combines data...
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventu...
Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes contradictory, deviations f...
We present a model of judgment under uncertainty, in which an agent combines data received from the ...
Kahneman’s latest work takes us one step closer to understanding flaws in human decision making. Pol...
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventu...
The present work describes the model of heuristic judgment of Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and two ex...
New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of “dual pr...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
Information stored in memory influences the formation of preferences and beliefs in most everyday de...
The paper conducts the collective specification of fallacies in the perception of reality made by ma...
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during...
The paper conducts the collective specification of fallacies in the perception of reality made by ma...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
How and when are individuals more or less influenced by heuristics when making judgments? The first...
We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking, ” in which an agent combines data...
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventu...
Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes contradictory, deviations f...