Separatists, Gangsters and Other Statesmen: The State, Secession and Organized Crime in Serbia and Georgia, 1989-2012

What role does organized crime play in determining the success of separatist movements? I explore the role of organized crime in the separatist movements of Kosovo in Serbia and South Ossetia in Georgia, two most similar cases that have generated different outcomes in levels of separatist movement success in 1989-2012 (inclusive). Through the comparison, I argue in six propositions that organized crime can both promote and retard separatist movement success. The explanatory propositions are: (1) organized crime can be formative of state structure, capacity and stability; (2) popular support for the separatist movement can directly depend on organized criminal activities; (3) organized criminal capacity can – through its relations to the host state and separatist movement – hinder or advance separatist success; (4) the ethnic heterogeneity/homogeneity of organized crime may determine its capacity and willingness to promote separatist success; (5) organized crime contributes to separatist movement success when it is (a) prepared and (b) predisposed to divert regional smuggling opportunities towards movement goals; and (6) whether host state repression helps or harms the separatist movement depends on the role that organized crime is fulfilling vis-à-vis the state and separatists. The argument is developed in four steps. First, I examine regional indicators of a connection between separatist success and organized crime, justifying a comparison of Serbia/Kosovo and Georgia/South Ossetia as most similar cases. Second, I process-trace changes in the relational triad of host state, separatist movement and organized crime over the 24-year history, contending that different trajectories in these relations account for different levels of success for the two separatist movements. Third, I examine under what conditions aggregate regional smuggling trends before critical junctures of movement success in fact contribute to that success; I model criminal “filtering” of the aggregate criminal flows as a determinant of whether separatist goals are advanced or hindered. Finally, I compare two nefarious criminal episodes – organ smuggling in Kosovo and nuclear smuggling in South Ossetia – that harmed the separatist movements; I show that superior organized criminal capacity in Kosovo (reflected in its infrastructure, autonomy and community) managed to contain the harm of exposure from the nefarious episode.Sociolog