Credit cycle stabilization can be a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital requirements on banks. The model comprises two productive sectors: in one sector, firms can finance investments through a bond market. In the other, firms rely on bank credit. Financial frictions limit banks’ borrowing capacity. Aggregate shocks impact firms’ productivity. From a welfare perspective, banks lend too much in high productivity states and too little in bad states, although financial markets are complete. Imposing a (stricter) capital requirement in good states corrects capital misallocation, increases expected output and social welfare. Even with risk-neutral agents, stabilization of credit cycles is socially beneficial
We use a macroeconomic model of the euro area featuring a bank sector to study the pro-cyclical effe...
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macropr...
2008 This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expre...
Credit cycle stabilization can be a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital requirements on ...
We provide a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital ratios on banks. In our simple model, b...
Empirical evidence shows that banks tend to lend too much during booms, and too littleduring recessi...
We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relat...
We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits...
Central banks need a new type of quantitative models for guiding their financial stability decisions...
This paper investigates the effect of broad-based versus sectoral capital requirements using a dynam...
Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We p...
First published online: 23 November 2009Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in exces...
We analyze the cyclical effects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive (Basel I...
This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capit...
The proposed risk sensitive minimum requirements of the new Basel capital accord have raised concern...
We use a macroeconomic model of the euro area featuring a bank sector to study the pro-cyclical effe...
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macropr...
2008 This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expre...
Credit cycle stabilization can be a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital requirements on ...
We provide a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital ratios on banks. In our simple model, b...
Empirical evidence shows that banks tend to lend too much during booms, and too littleduring recessi...
We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relat...
We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits...
Central banks need a new type of quantitative models for guiding their financial stability decisions...
This paper investigates the effect of broad-based versus sectoral capital requirements using a dynam...
Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We p...
First published online: 23 November 2009Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in exces...
We analyze the cyclical effects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive (Basel I...
This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capit...
The proposed risk sensitive minimum requirements of the new Basel capital accord have raised concern...
We use a macroeconomic model of the euro area featuring a bank sector to study the pro-cyclical effe...
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macropr...
2008 This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expre...