Add to ORKGAgency theory predicts that optimal levels of executive incentives are influenced by a trade-off between achieving CEO-shareholder goal alignment, and paying the CEO a risk premium. Executives with higher wealth levels and therefore lower absolute risk aversion should demand a lower risk premium for compensation at risk, and thus equity incentives are predicted to be stronger. Regressions are run of CEO equity incentives on wealth, using data on individual wealth from Norwegian tax authorities. For one of two incentive measures used, empirical results indicate that – in line with predictions of theory – higher-wealth CEOs have stronger equity incentives
In order to determine the structure of the optimal CEO contract, we create a principal agent model a...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
Agency theory predicts that optimal levels of executive incentives are influenced by a trade-off bet...
Agency theory predicts that optimal levels of executive incentives are influenced by a trade-off bet...
Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs re-ceive stronger incen...
In this thesis, we have studied the role of CEO equity incentives in a payout decision, with a focu...
In this thesis, we have studied the role of CEO equity incentives in a payout decision, with a focus...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.Includes bib...
Abstract: In this paper, we employ unique data on the personal wealth of the CEOs ’ of the listed Sw...
I examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure ge...
Using an event study approach on a sample of 72 acquisitions by Norwegian listed firms we study the ...
This paper explores the relationship between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management base on...
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and thei...
1 Abstract The equity-based incentives are considered to be one of the instruments helping to motiva...
In order to determine the structure of the optimal CEO contract, we create a principal agent model a...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
Agency theory predicts that optimal levels of executive incentives are influenced by a trade-off bet...
Agency theory predicts that optimal levels of executive incentives are influenced by a trade-off bet...
Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs re-ceive stronger incen...
In this thesis, we have studied the role of CEO equity incentives in a payout decision, with a focu...
In this thesis, we have studied the role of CEO equity incentives in a payout decision, with a focus...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.Includes bib...
Abstract: In this paper, we employ unique data on the personal wealth of the CEOs ’ of the listed Sw...
I examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure ge...
Using an event study approach on a sample of 72 acquisitions by Norwegian listed firms we study the ...
This paper explores the relationship between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management base on...
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and thei...
1 Abstract The equity-based incentives are considered to be one of the instruments helping to motiva...
In order to determine the structure of the optimal CEO contract, we create a principal agent model a...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...
We investigate whether and how managerial risk aversion influences the structuring of the generalist...