This study aims to highlight the importance of protecting investors’ rights,and particularly those of minority shareholders.This study addresses the predominant control-ownership structure of the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Istanbul (BI) using the data for 2015. It shows the most common control-ownership structure within business groups, in which shareholders exercise control over a group of firms and maintain a small stake of firms’ equities.Turkish firms are categorised with highly concentrated ownership and families’ being the dominant shareholders owning more than 80% of all publically listed firms in BI. The study results indicate that the divergence between cash rights and control rights (wedge)in the top 100 Turkish firms is main...
In Eurasia, Turkey has a “crony” capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) i...
Most literature addressing the structure of corporate ownership compares dispersed ownership (DO) wi...
This study illustrates how control-ownership wedge impacts the monitoring role of the corporate boar...
The motivation of this study stems from the importance of protecting investors’ rights, and particul...
The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and contro...
The incentive of this study stems from the significance of protecting minority shareholders’ rights....
Purpose of the study is to investigate the changing ownership structures in the Turkish non-financia...
Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics o...
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between minority shareholders’ rights and...
This paper examines the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownersh...
<p>This study investigates the effects of ownership structure on the performance of the listed compa...
Using Turkish data, in this study it is investigated that whether a firm’s ownership structure has a...
Turkey is one of the eight countries that currently have a corporate governance index for firms list...
Due to the recent global scandals of large corporations in the most developed markets of the world, ...
PURPOSE– This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of list...
In Eurasia, Turkey has a “crony” capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) i...
Most literature addressing the structure of corporate ownership compares dispersed ownership (DO) wi...
This study illustrates how control-ownership wedge impacts the monitoring role of the corporate boar...
The motivation of this study stems from the importance of protecting investors’ rights, and particul...
The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and contro...
The incentive of this study stems from the significance of protecting minority shareholders’ rights....
Purpose of the study is to investigate the changing ownership structures in the Turkish non-financia...
Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics o...
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between minority shareholders’ rights and...
This paper examines the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownersh...
<p>This study investigates the effects of ownership structure on the performance of the listed compa...
Using Turkish data, in this study it is investigated that whether a firm’s ownership structure has a...
Turkey is one of the eight countries that currently have a corporate governance index for firms list...
Due to the recent global scandals of large corporations in the most developed markets of the world, ...
PURPOSE– This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of list...
In Eurasia, Turkey has a “crony” capitalist system with majority control and business groups (BGs) i...
Most literature addressing the structure of corporate ownership compares dispersed ownership (DO) wi...
This study illustrates how control-ownership wedge impacts the monitoring role of the corporate boar...