Add to ORKGA multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conflicts, yields new theoretical justification for existing empirical findings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battlefield behavior
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stocha...
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War has been heralded as one of the most influential theories of war. It ha...
In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and contradictory theories hav...
A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private val...
We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in wh...
This paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug of war a pair o...
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in...
We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each ind...
Contest outcomes often involve some mix of skill and chance. In three essays, I vary the sources of ...
This article examines behavior in two-person constant-sum Colonel Blotto games in which each player ...
This article considers whether Clausewitz’s account of the nature of war is universal to all wars, i...
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, ...
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous mov...
Tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, mana...
We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their impl...
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stocha...
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War has been heralded as one of the most influential theories of war. It ha...
In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and contradictory theories hav...
A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private val...
We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in wh...
This paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug of war a pair o...
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in...
We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests, where each ind...
Contest outcomes often involve some mix of skill and chance. In three essays, I vary the sources of ...
This article examines behavior in two-person constant-sum Colonel Blotto games in which each player ...
This article considers whether Clausewitz’s account of the nature of war is universal to all wars, i...
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, ...
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous mov...
Tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, mana...
We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their impl...
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stocha...
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War has been heralded as one of the most influential theories of war. It ha...
In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and contradictory theories hav...