We establish that a monopoly bank never uses collateral as a screening device. A pooling equilibrium always exists in which all borrowers pay the same interest rate and put zero collateral. Absence of screening leads to socially inefficient lending in the sense that some socially productive firms are denied credit due to excessively high interest rate
In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory refor...
The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans ...
Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to...
We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric i...
We offer a novel explanation for the use of collateral based on the dual function of banks to provid...
As this article shows, the pro-debtor U.S. Bankruptcy Code alone can cause credit rationing, even wi...
It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situ...
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an infor...
It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situ...
Can the Banks “Forget” their Credit Collaterals? In their well-known paper “Imperfect Informati...
We show that collateral plays an important role in the design of debt contracts, the provision of cr...
The work discusses a basic proposition in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selectio...
In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory refor...
The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans ...
Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to...
We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric i...
We offer a novel explanation for the use of collateral based on the dual function of banks to provid...
As this article shows, the pro-debtor U.S. Bankruptcy Code alone can cause credit rationing, even wi...
It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situ...
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an infor...
It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situ...
Can the Banks “Forget” their Credit Collaterals? In their well-known paper “Imperfect Informati...
We show that collateral plays an important role in the design of debt contracts, the provision of cr...
The work discusses a basic proposition in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selectio...
In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory refor...
The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans ...
Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to...