Classical Counterinsurgency: A Comparison of Malaya, Algeria and Romania

Highlighting the significance of counterinsurgencies fought in the aftermath of the Second World War for contemporary theory and practice, this thesis is a comparative analysis of the campaigns fought in Malaya, Algeria and Romania between 1944 and 1962. The case selection allows an engagement both with Western and non-Western patterns of anti-guerrilla warfare, allowing this work to conceive counterinsurgency as a coherent object of study across time and cultures. The research question at the heart of the thesis is what accounts for success in counterinsurgency? Considering that the government’s main tasks in dealing with armed rebellion are to prevent the spread of rebellion, to identify, find and eliminate the rebels, this work analyses the three campaigns on three dimensions: population control, intelligence and intelligence operations and military operations. In relation to population control, the findings point to the hollowness of the prevalent narrative concerning “hearts and minds” approaches and instead highlight the centrality of massive deportations and physical and psychological intimidation and control of targeted populations. The study of intelligence engages with the relative merits of centralized and decentralized organization for counterinsurgency campaigns, evaluates the use of interrogation and torture and assesses the role of infiltration and counter-gangs. Military approaches such as patrols, cordoning, garrisoning, raids, special forces operations are analysed in relation to achieving success in the campaigns. The concluding comparison section discusses the three cases in connection to contemporary counterinsurgencies. In answering the research question, the thesis argues that population control is the strategic-level answer in counterinsurgency, which makes it problematic for present-day contingencies. It also points out the tactical-level relevance of intelligence and military operations