Toward a consensus on the nature of contemporary insurgecy : an analysis of counterinsurgency in the War on Terror 2001-2010

Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, US President George W. Bush announced a War on Terror to promulgate democracy and ameliorate the conditions that spawn terrorism in the Middle East. COIN thus attained a newfound strategic influence since the initiation of regime changes in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. This study establishes a conceptual framework for judging COIN utilising the Hybrid War and Insurgent Archipelago models. The Hybrid War model best encapsulates the multi-modal nature of contemporary insurgency which has co-manifested with criminality, nationalism and politicised Islam. This thesis contends that the lack of understanding of the enemy has been of central importance in preventing victory. A case study methodology is utilised to evaluate and compare COIN conducted during the Iraq troop surge and in Afghanistans Kunar province. This thesis determines that the positive narrative concerning those COIN campaigns exceeds the actual correlation between COIN and reductions in violence and insurgency. A clear consensus on the nature of contemporary insurgency and its remedies must be established to avoid future failures in COIN