Role models and responsibility

This thesis looks at the concept of role models. Its concern is to provide an account of what role models are, how the role model relationship functions, and of the special responsibilities relating to role models. The original account of role models, belonging to Robert Merton, held that being a role model was simply a matter of modelling a role. I argue against this. On my account, a role model is simply a person who has some quality of theirs emulated; the issue of role is only occasionally relevant. To be a role model, I argue, simply involves being emulated. There must be someone for whom you are a role model, as well as something that you model, and that is all. My account is strongly influenced by Aristotelian ethics, as well as by the work of Iris Murdoch, Andrew Michael Flescher, and Albert Bandura. There is clear evidence from social psychology that people commonly emulate role models unconsciously, or passively, without their having chosen to do so. My contention is that the prevalence of this passive emulation creates a specific type of responsibility for role models, since their behaviour is able to cause similar behaviour in others. However, this does not mean that those who emulate role models lack responsibility for their behaviour. On the contrary, I argue that they too have specific responsibilities regarding their role models. Moreover, I argue that both parties are able to be simultaneously responsible. A role model can be responsible for his influence without this making those who emulate him any less responsible for their own actions