Do the Autonomy of Free Will and the Principle of Legality in State Contracts Create a Paradox?

La “autonomía de la voluntad”, esa hermosa matriz del derecho privado liberal clásico (“quien dice contractual, dice justo”), es actualmente un instrumento importante de regulación de las relaciones sociales. La observación del funcionamiento real –efectivo– de esta herramienta legal, revela la identidad del individuo social post-moderno, cuya libertad es a la vez inmensa e irrisoria, fuente de poder ilimitado y de sujeción servil a las directivas de organizaciones, públicas y privadas, que establecen lo que se debe querer para querer eficazmente. Ejercer esta prerrogativa significa adherir a normas que se imponen –de hecho– independientemente de su fuente, mas en una medida que puede ser determinada. Ello ha llevado a cuestionar la importancia del principio de legalidad en los contratos estatales, pues en la actualidad la autonomía de la voluntad se plantea como garantía eficaz contra la arbitrariedad del Estado.“Free will” – that beautiful matrix of classic liberal private law (they say “Whoever contracts accepts that it’s fair”) is in reality an important instrument for regulating social relationships. The observation of the real – effective – functioning of this legal tool reveals in a paradigmatic way the identity of the individual in post-modern society whose freedom is both immense and insignificant, and an unlimited source of power and servile subjection to directives of public and private organizations which effectively establish what should be desired. Exercising that prerogative means adhering to norms that are imposed by oneself –in fact- independently of its source, more than in a measure that can be determined. The above is applied to question the principle of legality in state contracts in which the real principle of “free will” acts as an effective warranty against state abuse