A possible delimitation between facts and states of affairs

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p361 We argue that it is possible to differentiate facts from states of affairs ontologically. We defend a Platonist ontology, based on Chateaubriand (2001 and 2005), that is hierarchized in levels and types. It contains concrete objects as the most basic entities, logical and non-logical properties, facts, states of affairs, among other entities. While some current philosophers (such as Chateaubriand 2001 and Armstrong 1997) do not distinguish facts from states of affairs, we argue that this is not how they should be treated. We consider that, even though they are both instantiated entities, they have different features. We are convinced that, in a hierarchized ontology, facts and states of affairs should occupy different levels, have different types, as well as different characteristics. In this article, we will show what is the distinction we propose, as well as we what are the advantages that our distinction possess